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ABSTRACT. This paper presents a phenomenological account of the imagination in its
salient  features  for  contemporary  discussions  concerning  virtual  reality  and
computer  game  experience.  As  I  shall  argue,  Husserl’s  conception  of  the
imagination as a distinctive kind of intentionality offers an account that does away
with any “representational” relation between the artifact and the imagined object,
thus allowing for a genuinely phenomenological account of imaginary objects and
their  corresponding  form  of  manifestation  in  experience.  In  this  light,  I  shall
outline a more complex notion of a virtual fictional object. I argue that fictional
objects are conglomerate objects, that is, objects constituted in terms of different
stratifications of objecthood: perceptual thing, imaginary object, symbol. Lastly, I
shall sketch another insight from Husserl’s phenomenology of the imagination: the
imagination,  as  a  lived  experience,  is  a  “fictionalizing”  or  “virtualizing”  of
consciousness  (and not just its object). The consciousness of the virtual entails a
(partial) “virtualization” of consciousness itself. 
1.
Over  the  past  decades,  the  appeal  and  sophistication  of  videogames  and
computer generated virtual environments has steadily grown with spectacular
advances  in  computational  power,  game  design,  and  programming.  The
aesthetic and narrative sensibilities of designers and gamers has equally made
impressive  strides,  thus  elevating  many  computer  games  to  the  level  of
aesthetic,  cinematic,  and  literary  artifacts  of  striking  quality.  In  World  of
Warcraft, players create characters along with thousands of other individuals,
and  interact  within  the  expansive  fictional  world  of  Azeroth  in  pursuit  of
objectives,  increased  levels  of  character  talent  and  abilities,  rewards,  and
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emotional  satisfaction. Whether in the form of  MMORPGs such as  World of
Warcraft or  a  virtual  reality  such  as  Second  Life,  avatars  operate  within  a
fictional  and primarily visual  world (on screen) generated through complex
and evolving social  codes,  symbolic  systems of  meaning,  economic activity,
and emotional and psychological investment. Even if the nomenclature, logic,
and culture  of  any particular  game –  for  example,  the  wonderfully  strange
world of Bioshock –  relates but obliquely to the world of our everyday concerns
and experiences, the basic kind of experience in video games or virtual reality is
familiar to each of us as a fiction lived without conflation of reality.
Given this primacy of the lived experience of fictions, the relative paucity of
philosophical reflection on the imagination – without which the experience of
fiction is impossible – in the sprawling literature on videogames and virtual
reality is striking. The exercise of the imagination is repeatedly acknowledged,
yet rarely receives the sustained analysis required for understanding its role in
the constitution of simulated realities, interactive fictions, and virtual lives as
meaningful lived experiences. A sample of recent studies on virtual reality, or
“VR,”  and  videogames  attests  to  this  situation.1 In  How  Images  Think,  Ron
Burnett usefully defines cyber-worlds «as third-person image-spaces, that is,
environments that come to participants as if they could be converted into first-
person experiences through an investment in them»; in  Game Design: Theory
and  Practice,  Richard  Rouse  identifies  the  desire  for  fantasy  as  motivating
players to «engage in socially unacceptable behavior in a safe environment»; in
Coming of Age in Second Life, Tom Boellstorff concludes his ethnographic study
of Second Life with the proposal that «the ethnography of virtual worlds is, in
a sense, the ethnography of the “as if”, a state of being in which ‘the world of
the “unreal” is just as important as the world of the so-called real or actual’». 2
The phenomenon of the “as if”  is  widely acknowledged  in some form as  an
essential dimension of VR and video games, yet in each of the studies just cited
one notices a recurring pattern of a  mere  acknowledgment of the centrality of
the imagination without an analysis of the imagination. Boellstorff’s statement
is in this respect revealing: his recognition of the imagination’s central role for
virtual worlds is entirely mediated through the slim vehicle of a quote from
Vaihinger’s  Philosophy of  the  As If,  thus effectively foreclosing the burden of
addressing directly and in detail  the exercise of the imagination at work in
virtual worlds – the stated primary object of an ethnography of the “as if.” 
Even when the role of the imagination is more emphatically acknowledged,
1 I  adopt  the  common  shorthand  of  VR as  a  blanket  term  for  “cyber-worlds,”  “virtual  reality,”
“simulated reality,” etc.
2 BURNETT 2005, p. 94; ROUSE 2001, p. 7; BOELLSTORFF 2008, p. 249. 
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discussions  often  fail  to  integrate  insights  garnered  from  the  relationship
between the imagination and VR into a broader theory of the imagination. As a
consequence, connections between diverse manifestations of the imagination
remain closed to comparative investigation. The immersion of drivers in the
virtual  lives  of  their  avatars  and the  virtual  worlds  of  their  habitation is  a
widely  recognized  aspect  of  VR.  Residents  in  Second  Life  routinely  form
intense emotional and psychological relations with other avatars: the death of
an  avatar  provokes  grief  within  a  on-line  community;  the  marriage  of  two
avatars engenders joy, etc. This digital crystallization of intense and empathetic
identification can be seen as recalling a comparable form of experience with the
passionate  reception  of  eighteenth-century  epistolary  novels.  The  epistolary
novel produced a cultivated intimacy between fictional characters and flesh-
and-blood readers, fostering intense emotional and psychological investments
with  the  fictional  lives  of  others  (e.g.,  Richardson’s  Clarissa).  In  Éloge  de
Richardson,  Diderot  reports:  «J’ai  entendu  disputer  sur  la  conduite  de  ses
[Richardson’s]  personages,  comme  sur des  événements  reels;  louer,  blamer
Paméla,  Clarisse,  Grandisson,  comme  des personages  vivants  quo’on  aurait
connus,  et  auxquels  on  aurait  pris  le  plus  grand  intérêt».3 Richardson’s
characters are here described as “virtual” (bereft of the word, of course) in all
the relevant senses  that  resonate with  our understanding of  the term today
with regard to the experience of VR. Closer to our century, the relation between
the imagination in VR and the imagination in literature, especially the genre of
fantasy and science fiction, has often been remarked upon. The influence of
Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings on the culture and content of VR and gaming culture
(RPGs)  is  especially apparent.  The difference between playing  Dungeon and
Dragons and Dungeons and Dragons: Baldur’s Gate, however, cannot be reduced
to a difference between a less imaginative rendering and a more imaginative
rendering of fictions on the basis of a difference in “representational media,” as
proposed, for example, by Travinor.4 Is not the graphic description of violence
and emotion  in  Homer’s  The  Iliad arguably  no  less  visceral  than a  combat
sequence in Baldur’s Gate or in the narrative of rhetorically gifted DM guiding a
party through The Keep on the Border Lands? A treatment of the imagination in
virtual  fictions  of  any  kind should  ideally  be  situated  within  a  broader
consideration  of  the  imagination  that  is  able  to  fashion  a  mosaic  of
comparisons, through which  other manifestations of the imaginary, including
various literary forms, are brought into the scope of reflection. 
Historically, the concept of imagination has always remained inter- or cross-
3 DIDEROT 1994, p. 37 (my emphasis).
4 TRAVINOR 2009, p. 59.
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disciplinary, not limited to any single domain of human experience. A brief
glance to the history of the concept of the imagination since Plato and Aristotle
reveals two basic challenges for any conception of the imagination. The first
consists in the question of whether a description of the imagination, as either a
faculty of the soul,  power of reason, or act of  consciousness,  is bound to a
hybridization of elements: perception, cognitive, image. The imagination has
alternatively been understood as a power of image-formation, quasi-perceptual
intuition, quasi-cognitive apprehension, etc. A second – and related challenge –
turns on the question of whether a unified concept of the imagination is at all
attainable or whether the “concept” of the imagination must be seen as a set of
family resemblances.  Both challenges loom large over any discussion of the
imagination  and  must  remain  questions  that  cannot  be  decided  here.  This
difficulty of circumscribing the concept (and hence domain) of the imagination
reflects its protean character. The history of the imagination is the history of
diverse ways of imagining, and to make this complexity freighted with added
difficulty, the history of different ways of imagining is furthermore entangled
with different technologies of image-making and inscription-making (alphabet,
signs, etc.).  The phenomenon of VR exemplifies this protean character to an
unparalleled degree,  comparable,  for many,  to  the invention of  the printing
press, alphabetic writing systems, or pictorial representation – even though it
remains for the moment an  open question whether VR represents actually a
comparable revolution with those events indicated above. 
This  comparison  nonetheless  draws  its  force  by  calling  attention  to  the
inseparability of ways of imagining from the technological platforms for the
imagination: writing, painting, etc. Beginning with Paleolithic cave paintings,
revolutions  of  the  imagination  have  also  been  revolutions  of  aesthetic
technology  or,  in  other  words,  technologies  of  the  perceptual  senses.
Unquestionably,  the  platform  of  the  image can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  most
significant  technologies  for  the  imagination.  Computer  games,  simulated
realities, and CAVE environments are each examples of technological platforms
for  the  re-shaping  and exercise  of  the  imagination.  The image remains  the
critical technological platform for the modern imagination. The ocular drive, or
the drive to visualize (to see as well as to be seen), dominates the post-modern
imagination. Not surprisingly, the hybridization of the technological and the
natural  (or:  “the virtual”  and “the real”)  that  is  often seen as defining our
technological age (e.g., Bruno Latour) is already discernable in the constitution
of  the  image  as  such,  which,  as  Husserl  insightfully  characterized,  has  the
constitution of a “perceptual fiction,” or, in other words, a hybridization of the
perceptual and the imaginary. It would also be too narrow to draw an overly
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simplistic contrast between the so-called “dynamic” images of VR and the so-
called “static” images of paintings. Late 19th-century and early 20th-century art
historians such as Alois  Reigl  and Aby Warburg had already pioneered the
notion of an “animate” or “dynamic” image. Images are not inert objects.5  
The protean character of the imagination, as exemplified in the visual image,
is furthermore associated with other concepts that are as diffuse in meaning as
the  imagination  itself.  The  volatility  of  contemporary  nomenclature  gives
evidence  of  the  degree  to  which  VR  remains  an  “open-phenomenon”  –  a
phenomenon still in the making and still open as to its cultural, psychological,
and  anthropological  significance.  Nowhere  is  this  volatility  more  apparent
than with distinction between “the virtual” and “the real” – a philosophical
distinction that can only be  hazarded – as well as with the string of (mainly)
synonymous  terms  such  as  “synthetic  world,”  “digital  world,”  “artificial
world,” “virtual world,” “possible world,” etc. The distinction between “real”
and “virtual” is a case in point. One common way to draw such a distinction
depends  on  a  mirror  distinction  between  “perception”  and  “imagination.”
How  we  understand  the  relationship  between  perception  and  imagination
underpins how we think about the distinction between “real” and “virtual.”
The  imagination is  not  a  solitary  conceptual  creature  or  phenomenon;  it  is
embedded in a nest of other concepts and associated fields of meaning. It is
therefore not surprising that the paucity of reflection on the imagination in VR
is  allied  with  other  conceptual  impoverishments.  Undoubtedly,  the  most
important of these is the concept of “world,” showcased in Linden Lab’s motto:
Your  World,  Your  Imagination.  Yet,  as  Boellstorff  remarks,  «the  term “world”
appears with great frequency» in a host of pairings (virtual world, cyber world,
etc.), yet it «remains far less theorized than the words with which it is paired». 6
The ambivalent reticence of tackling head-on what constitutes a fictional world
is apparent in Kendall Walton’s caution to «rely as little as possible on any
notion of fictional worlds» while at the same time admitting that «we cannot
ignore fictional worlds entirely.»7
2.
There are exceptions. Yet, ever here, as with a recent philosophical discussion
of videogames that shall provide a first orientation for my own considerations
5 See for example PAPAPETROS 2012.
6 BOELLSTORFF 2008, p. 17.
7 WALTON 1990, pp. 57-8.
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in this  paper,  much still  remains to be developed. In  The Art of  Videogames,
Grant  Travinor  develops an adaption of  Kendall  Walton’s  theory of  “make-
believe”  to  understand  the  “virtual  fictions”  of  videogames.  Travinor
understands fictions as «representational artifacts that depict situations with
an imagined existence only».8 Walton’s theory of “fictionalism,” which can be
situated in the lineage of Vaihinger’s theory of fictions, shifts the problem of
fictional objects away from the question of linguistic reference to the domain of
“pragmatics”  and  “make-believe,”  in  other  words,  of  how  representational
artifacts,  or “props,” are  used  for the imaginary purpose for which they are
intended.9 Whether playing charades, reading a novel, playing  Dungeons and
Dragons or  World of  Warcraft,  fictional characters are based on some kind of
representational  artifact:  an  ordinary  item,  words  on  a  page,  miniature
figurines, or a computer icon on a screen. “Make-believe” is not the suspension
of belief but the adoption or enactment of modified forms of belief on the basis
of designated “props” that allow for and support psychological, emotional, and
intellectual  engagement  in  a  world  of  fiction.  We  can  thus  speak  of  an
imaginative attitude or disposition; my attitude is changed and appropriate to
the fictional world in which I am engaged. This notion of what Peter Lamarque
calls  “fictional  stance”  is  clearly  anticipated  in  Husserl’s  notion  of
Stellungnahme. Yet, for Husserl, every form of intentionality towards the world
is  defined by a  corresponding form of  Stellungnahme,  such that  a  “fictional
stance” represents the stance specific to the imaginary as a distinctive form of
intentionality.  Husserl  proposes  a  much  stronger  thesis:  toggling  from  one
stance to another is not akin, as Susan Feigin suggests, to a “shift” or “slide” in
seeing-as, but a more robust change in the kind of intentionality: to imagine a
unicorn as opposed to perceiving a horse is not captured in term of a putative
difference in “seeing-as” (as with the paradigmatic duck-rabbit example).
Important as this  analysis  of  fictions is,  Travinor nevertheless forgoes any
discussion  of  the  “cognitive  basis”  of  make-believe.  As  he  writes:  «What
exactly the cognitive basis of make-believe or pretense is, especially in its basis
in the brain, is not something that I can say a great deal about in this book, and
so  my  reference  to  it  will  remain  in  mostly  functional  terms.  Whether  it
involves mental simulation and mirror neurons, and how closely it resembles our
everyday representation of the world, there is some functional aspect of the
mind that allows us to imagine that things are not the case».10 Travinor in this
respect replicates a theoretical limitation in Walton’s own work. As Travinor
8 TRAVINOR 2009, p. 38.
9 See BOURIAU 2013, p. 182 ff.
10 TRAVINOR 2009, p. 40.
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himself notes: «It might be noted, though, that Walton is somewhat coy about
getting into the psychological details of what exactly make-believes are».11 Such
coyness appears infectious. It might be understandable that Travinor does not
aim to develop an account of the complex cognitive nature of fictions in a study
whose  aim  is  rather  to  explore  various  philosophical  issues  raised  by
videogames as interactive fictions. Fair enough. On the other hand, even with
this reasonable constraint, Travinor’s characterization of what an analysis of the
cognitive  basis  of  the  imagination  would  require  reveals  an  uncritical
assumption regarding the imagination as a form of consciousness (as well as
the  proper  method  for  its  descriptive  analysis),  namely,  an  account  of
consciousness  framed by  notions  such  as  “mental  simulation”  and “mirror
neurons.” And yet, as Travinor himself implicitly recognizes: «videogames just
are representational artifacts that depict situations with an imagined existence
only, and that they rely on our cognitive abilities to imagine such things».12 As
already signaled, Travinor omits any consideration of the second part of this
general definition, namely, the cognitive abilities on which virtual fictions rely.
Yet, the two aspects of his definition of videogames as virtual fictions imply a
certain conception of the cognitive basis of the imagination: representational
artifact  and  imagined  existence  only.  Both  aspects  re-inforce  the  other:  the
emphasis  on  the  representational character  of  the  artifacts,  or  “props,”
underlying or supporting virtual fictions goes hand in hand with the insistence
that such fictions only possess an imagined existence, viz, as represented by
the cognitive abilities of a consciousness. 
Whereas  Travinor’s  interest  lies  in  understanding  the  fictive  nature  of
videogames, in my subsequent reflections, I propose to sketch the outlines of a
phenomenological  account  of  the  imagination  in  its  salient  features  for
contemporary discussions concerning the phenomenon of virtual reality and
compute game experience. Any theory of virtual fiction must imply a theory of
the imagination; it is this latter concern that frames my interest in this paper,
not the former, although, claims about the constitution of the imagination as a
form of consciousness often entail claims about the nature of fictions. I propose
to recuperate central insights in Travinor’s notion of virtual fiction from within
a phenomenological analysis of the “cognitive basis” of the imagination or, in
other  words,  a  phenomenological  analysis  of  the  imagination  as  a  form  of
intentionality. As I shall argue, Husserl’s conception of the imagination as a
distinctive kind of intentionality offers an alternative account that does away
with  any “representational”  relation between  the  artifact  and the  imagined
11 TRAVINOR 2009, p. 41.
12 TRAVINOR 2009, p. 44.
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object.  Moreover,  the question of  “existence” – of  whether imagined objects
exist  or  not,  or  possess  a  special  form of  existence  –  is  to  be  bracketed  or
neutralized, thus allowing for a genuinely phenomenological  account of the
constitution of imaginary objects in their distinctive form of transcendence as
unities  of  meaning  and  their  corresponding  form  of  givenness,  or
manifestation,  in  experience.  Moreover,  I  shall  outline  from  a  Husserlian
vantage-point  a more complex notion of  a virtual  fictional  object.  Based on
Husserl’s analysis of an image, fictional objects, whether “perceptual fictions”
such as images or pure fictions of the imagination, are phenomenologically to
be understood as complex or conglomerate objects, that is, objects constituted
in terms of different stratifications of objecthood: perceptual thing, imaginary
object,  symbol.  Lastly,  I  shall  sketch another cardinal  insight  from Husserl’s
phenomenology of the imagination: the splitting of consciousness within the
imaginary. In this manner, the imagination, as a lived experience, transforms in
“fictionalizing” or “virtualizing” consciousness itself (and not just its object).
Can a phenomenological approach offer an analysis of the cognitive basis of
make-believe that would both avoid a reductionist account of consciousness to
“mirror neurons” and provide an analysis of those features of the imagination
that  Travinor deems “particularly useful  for explaining the fictive nature of
videogames,” and as taken from Walton’s theory of “make-believe,” without,
however, any of its phenomenological coyness? 
My  reflections  do  not  aim  at  a  comprehensive  treatment  of  either  a
phenomenological conception of the imagination or the relationship between
computer  games  /  VR  and  the  imaginary.  The  narrative  dimension  of
computer  games  and  VR,  for  example,  I  have  excluded  entirely  from
consideration. I  have also excluded a discussion of  the ludic constitution of
play-experience as well as any discussion of what constitutes a game. My aim is
both  more  narrow  and  preliminary:  it  is  to  explore  from  a  (Husserlian)
phenomenological  point of view the modes of  cognition – imagination and
image-consciousness – required for the constitution of imaginary worlds and
simulated realities in which the consciousness of the player or avatar projects
and discovers herself as another consciousness or life (as a character, fictional
person, etc.). Aside from the conceptual resources that phenomenology brings
to bear on the imagination, a phenomenological framework is ideally suited for
thinking about VR. Phenomenology attempts to map the conceptual geography
of consciousness in light of possible objects of experience. On the strength of its
suspension of any universal  assumption regarding the meaning of  reality,  a
phenomenological  study  of  cognition  examines  the  relation  between
consciousness and different regions of objects without subsuming those objects
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to  an  ontological  significance  that  would  not  be  disclosed  in  the  specific
manner of their own givenness. 
3.
Espen Aarseth has usefully proposed the idea of a “conglomerate object” in
order to describe the ontological structure of computer games and simulated
realties.13 A sword in World of Warcraft, for example, is a conglomerate object. Its
constitution as an object is a composition of different “elements” or “layers” of
meaning:  the metal  of  the sword is  fictional  to the  degree that  it  lacks  the
materiality of a real metal sword; the sharpness of the sword is simulated to
the degree that it behaves in prescribed ways within the game logic of World of
Warcraft  that simulates the behavior and properties of sharpness that would
belong to a real sword; and the value of the sword is real to the degree that it
possess real economic value (the sword can be auctioned on eBay) as well as
real emotional value as a function of a player’s emotional investment in the
having of such and such a sword, of the circumstances in which the player
gained the sword within the game-world, etc. Both of these values – economic
and emotional – reflect the real social value of the sword-object, both “on-line”
within World of Warcraft and “off-line” within eBay, blogs, and other spill-over
contexts.  When viewed in terms of  a game-object’s  social  value, there is  no
strict line demarcation between “real” and “virtual.” Instead, one should speak
of a membrane with variable degrees of elasticity. When viewed ontologically,
the  sword in  World  of  Warcraft lacks  the  critical  element  of  materiality  that
would  inscribe  it  within  the  spatio-temporal  world  of  causal  interactions.
Instead, its materiality is simulated to the degree that it is embedded within
motivational nexus of a player’s responses, expectations, and disappointments.
Aarseth’s  notion  of  virtual  objects  as  “conglomerate  objects”  provides  a
useful  point  of  departure  for  a  phenomenological  analysis.  In  Aarseth’s
thinking, the constitution of virtual objects as “conglomerate objects” is taken
to be an argument that videogames should not be considered along the same
lines as traditional fictions but should instead be recognized as having a special
“ontological” status as virtual objects. As Aarseth argues: «Game worlds and
their  objects  are  ontologically  different  from fictional  worlds».14 By fictional
worlds, Aarseth has in mind the world of Madame Bovary, for example. The
difference  between  virtual  worlds  and  fictional  worlds,  on  this  account,
13 AARSETH 2007.
14 Quoted in TRAVINOR 2009, p. 44.
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consists  in  the  former’s  dynamic  properties  (an  object  in  the  world  of
EverQuest)  in  contrast  to  the  latter’s  inertness  (an  object  in  the  world  of
Madame Bovary, etc). This argument has been challenged by Travinor along
different  lines  than  what  interests  me  here;  for  my purpose,  what  Aarseth
assumes is an ontological difference between virtual objects in relation to other
kinds of objects due to their “conglomerate” and “dynamic” constitution. What
interests me is to show that  all imaginary objects are in fact “conglomerate”
objects of some kind. As Husserl argues in his analysis of image-consciousness,
the  visual  image,  which  marks  the  threshold  and  tension  between  the
perceptual and the imaginary, is itself a conglomerate object. Indeed, Aarseth
overlooks that the virtual sword-object as depicted on the screen is not only a
conglomerate object in the three senses noted above; it is also a visual object –
an image on the screen.15 It is, so to speak, the first conglomerate object, and it
is  because  of  its  “conglomerate”  nature  that,  as  Husserl  argues,  the
consciousness  of  an  image cannot  be  understood in  representational  terms.
Both insights organize Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of what he calls
“image-consciousness.”
An image is inseparable from the consciousness of an image, that is, from a
consciousness for which the image is given as an image; one must perceive the
image  as  an  image.  Since  every  form  of  (objectifying)  consciousness  is  the
consciousness  of  an  object,  Husserl’s  phenomenological  analysis  of  image-
consciousness  centers  on  the  question:  what  kind  of  intentionality  is
responsible  for  the  constitution  of  images  as  objects  of  consciousness?  On
Husserl’s  account,  an  image  is  an  intentional  object  that  transcends
consciousness,  yet  its  transcendent character is  not  to be conflated with the
transcendence  of  perceptual  objects.  The  image  on  my  computer  screen,  a
painting  of  Napoleon,  and  a  photograph  of  my  friend  are  not  mental
representations  nor  are  these  intentional  objects  mediated  by  any  internal
mental  representation.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  image  itself  as  depicting
something that I perceive; what I apprehend is what is depicted in the image.
The  intentional  object  (Napoleon,  my  friend)  is  perceived  intuitively  as
transcending consciousness, i.e., as irreducible to the specific mental contents
of consciousness. As a type of intentionality, image-consciousness intends its
object (the image) in a manner comparable to perceptual experience: it is the
tree itself that I perceive. However, whereas perceptual consciousness intends
an object (the tree) with a single dimension, or meaning, of objectivity (within
the  context  of  changing  horizons  of  sides,  seen  and  unseen),  image-
consciousness intends a stratification of intentional objects or, in other words, a
15 Moreover: the sword-object is also a code-object; it is a specific string of code.
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conglomerate object. Moreover, a perceptual object possesses a materiality that
individuates in space and time as well as inscribed it within a causal web of
interactions: the tree exists in physical interaction with other material objects in
a way in which the The White Tree of Gondor does not (or a tree in Second
Life).
I take it be to one of Husserl’s central insights that an image is constituted as
a conglomerate object. On Husserl’s analysis, an image is composed of three
objects  that  are  given  to  consciousness  in  terms  of  a  nested  relation  of
foundation  and  founded.  Husserl  distinguishes  between  the  “image-thing”
(Bildding),  the “image-object” (Bildobjekt),  and the “image-subject” (Bildsujet).
At the perceptual level, an image is a material object or “thing.” It is a thing
made of wood; it is canvas, it is a pattern of pixels on a screen; it occupies a
spatial  location;  it  exists  within a  nexus  of  possible causal  interaction with
other material objects. This material thing, however, must be perceived as an
image or “image-object.” The colors and lines must be seen as an image (as
opposed to just being splotches of colors and a tangle of lines). Much as an
image can be a thing made of different types materiality (wood, stone, pixels),
an image-object  can be  fashioned differently,  that  is,  created or  constructed
according to different styles. Yet, an image-object (to perceive something as an
image) is in turn an image seen as depicting something, or what Husserl calls
an “image-subject,” the subject of the image (what it is about in depicting it). To
perceive an image as depicting an “image-subject” – to see the image as the
image of something – entails that I perceive a perceptual object (an “image-
thing”) as being an image (as an “image-object”),  that I  see  something  as an
image in which something else – Napoleon, my friend, etc. – is depicted.
In order to capture conceptually the phenomenon of seeing something in an
image, Husserl defines the image as “seeing-in.” When I look at an image, I see
the depicted image-subject in the image, even if the sense of “in” must here be
strictly understood in terms of transcendence. Napoleon is not literally “in” the
image; yet what I see is Napoleon as an appearance: he appears “in” or as his
image (even if when compared to the real perceptual experience of Napoleon I
might have noticed that he was not as tall, etc.). The image is the opening of a
perceptual  appearance to something other than this  kind of  appearance,  an
original “there-in” (Worin) or “opening of itself”  (Sichöffnens) in which a non-
appearance, something imaginary or not-present, appears.16 As Husserl notes,
«presentations  of  an image are strange presentations  in which a  perceptual
object  is  capable  and  determined  to  present  another  object  by  means  of
resemblance,  in  the  familiar  manner  that  a  physical  image  presents  an
16 FINK 1966, p. 75.
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original».17 The  perceptual  object  as  an  image  possesses  a  “reality-value”
(Realitätswert) that splits into two frameworks or contexts (Zusammenhänge). An
image is a manipulated aspect of perceptual experience, of the real, in which
something other than the real appears. This manner of construing the image as
a “seeing-in” is associated with the characterization of the image as a window.
In this respect, Husserl’s window-metaphor recalls a traditional conception of
the painting as awindow, through which we look (e.g. Alberti). This metaphor
of the image as a window is furthermore connected to the variable significance
of  surfaces  in  the  history  of  aesthetics.  An  image  can  be  thus  defined  as
technological  platform; the technology is  here the transformation of  surface
into depth, or an opening of sensibility. This is the sense in which an image
opens a distance within sensible appearance, as, for example, Paleolithic cave
paintings,  for  which,  according  to  some  interpreters,  these  paintings
functioned  like  a  membrane  between  reality  and  visionary  experience  of
altered perceptions.18 This metaphor of the window is, of course, powerfully re-
configured with VR and computer interfaces.
The conglomerate constitution of the image is keyed to what Husserl further
identifies as its mode of “dual-apprehension.” The object of apprehension is
the same, but not seen in the same manner. Image-consciousness is based on
the over-lapping apprehension of the physical object (image as thing; i.e., the
pixels on the screen as pixels) and the apprehension of the image-object (the
pixels  on  the  screen  are  the  image  qua  image  that  I  perceive);  these  two
apprehensions are in conflict (Widerstreit) with each other. When I perceive a
physical object as an image (in contrast to perceiving merely a physical object),
the apprehension of an image object “wins out” over the underlying perception
of the physical object. This idea of double-apprehension plays a central role in
the  constitution  of  image-consciousness  and  its  transformative  opening  of
perceptual  appearances.  Whereas  the  perceptual  givenness  of  the  image  as
physical  object  is  akin to the givenness of  other perceptual  objects,  Husserl
describes  the image-object  (to  see something as an image)  as a  “perceptual
fiction”  sustained  and  constituted  through  “perceptual  imagination.”  It  is
important  to  stress  that  the  fictional  character  of  the  image  is  not  to  be
conflated with illusions and hallucinations, in which case perceptual deception
of some kind is involved. To see something as an image is not to be under the
17 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 19. «[…] also jene [Bildvorstellungen] merkwürdigen Vorstellungen, bei
denen ein wahrgenommener Gegenstand einen anderen durch Ähnlichkeit  vorstellig zu machen
bestimmt und befähig ist, und zwar in der bekannten Weise, in der das physische Bilde das Original
vorstellig  macht». Cp.  FINK 1966, p. 74: «Wir sehen in einer Bildwelt hinein».  Husserl speaks of
“hineinschauen” and “hineinblicken” (“looking into”), HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 34, p. 31.
18 See WILLIAMS 2004.
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spell of an illusion; the issue here is not whether I take the image to be real, but
of whether I see at all something as an image, that I truly see an image, as
opposed to merely  a  physical  object  as such.  The imagination transforms a
perceptual  given  in  the  specific  sense  of  over-laying  an  interpretative
apprehension,  a  new  manner  of  “seeing-as.”  In  this  manner,  perceptual
appearances are opened to another form of fictional appearance. A distance
within appearance emerges; the appearance of the image-object is set against, or
in profile, with perceptual appearance. As Husserl writes: «The image-object is
given in a perceptual apprehension that is modified through the character of
the  imagination  and which,  thus,  carries  the  character  of  unreality  and of
conflict  with  the  actual  present».19 The  “unreality”  of  the  image  can  be
interpreted in a more contemporary register in terms of “virtuality.” The image
as image possesses a virtual manner of givenness.
The  underlying  perceptual  apprehension  is  modified  in  its  manner  of
presentation by the imagination, transformed from a perceptual presentation
(Gegenwärtigung) into a “re-presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung) of something
other-than-visible – the depicted and “spiritual” (geistig) image-subject seen in
the  image.  This  opening  of  perceptual  experience  is  in  conflict  with  itself,
stamped by the interjected character of the virtual. An image-object is a visual
fiction; it does not appear without a consciousness that implicitly posits the
image as not appearing in the same manner in which perceptual objects appear.
For these reasons, the image-object cannot be described as an object that exists
as real. On the contrary, as Husserl writes: «In truth, the image-object does not
exist; this does not just mean that the image-object does not exist outside my
consciousness.  The  image-object  does  not  exist  inside  my  consciousness;
indeed, the image-object does not have any existence».20 The image-object is “a
nothing” (ein Nichts). Although Husserl does not reach the Sartrean claim that
the transcendence of the image is the penetration of “nothingness” into the
plenitude of perceptual appearance, this insistence on the phenomenological
nothing  of  the  image-object  introduces  a  note  of  caution  for  any  uncritical
invocation of “ontology” for fictional objects.
The phenomenon of “seeing-in” identified by Husserl as constitutive of how
an image-subject is contrasted to the phenomenon of seeing through an image
with symbolic images. An image need not only or always depict; an image may
19 HUSSERL 1980,  Hua  XXIII,  p.  47.  «[…]  das  Bildobjekt  aber  ist  gegeben  in  einer
Wahrnehmungsauffassung, die modifiziert ist durch der Charakter der Imagination; sie trägt den
Charakter der Unwirklichkeit, des Widerstreits mit der aktuellen Gegenwart».
20 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 24. «Wahrhaft existiert das Bildobjekt nicht, das heißt nicht nur, es hat
keine Existenz außerhalb meines Bewusstseins, sondern auch, es hat keine solche innerhalb meines
Bewusstsein, es hat überhaupt keine Existenz».
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also symbolize. In the case of an image in which an image-subject comes to
appearance, we might speak of an immanent space of manifestation within the
image.  Husserl  in  this  regard  speaks  of  the  mode  of  “referring-into  itself”
(Hineinweisen).  The image-subject over-laps (deckt sich) with the image-object;
the depicted subject is apprehended in the image-object and thus represented
as  “non-appearing”  in  its  being-pictured  (nichterscheinende  bildmäßig
repräsentierte).21 The image-object depicts something other than itself – but the
object depicted in an image may either itself be an object that is real (e.g. my
brother) or an object that enjoys a purely imaginary givenness (e.g. Fafnir). In
both instances, the depicted image-subject is given to me in the image in the
form of “not-appearing,” as an absence, in the sense of «an appearance of a not-
now in a now» or,  in other words, «something not-appearing in something
appearing».22 The image-subject “saturates” or “penetrates” (durchdringen) the
apprehension of  the image object,  and this  applies  to  both types  of  image-
subjects, objects that have real, independent existence (my brother) as well as
purely imaginary objects (a unicorn). By contrast, a symbolic image is an image
in  the  mode  of  “referring-beyond”  (Hinwegweisen),  and  the  manners  of
symbolic  reference  are  here  as  wide  as  the  symbolic  system  in  which  any
particular symbol is legible. A symbolic image does not render its object present
(vorstellig) in the manner of an immanent image; we do not have a depiction or
“seeing  in”  (hineinschauen).  This  distinction  between  “immanent”  and
“symbolic” images is not exclusive; many game objects or avatars, which are
given in visual form on a computer screen, function as both an immanent and a
symbolic image. The visual  appearance of my avatar presents an imaginary
look that I fashion for myself, for which I can provide better or worst images;
but my image of  my avatar may function as a symbolic image, referring to
membership in a clan of Furries or a Gorean community. Indeed, images on a
screen in video games and VR often function dually as both picturing images
and symbolizing images, where the latter kind also might also carry further
social and economic meaning (within its fictional world).
The  essence  of  an  image  is  “re-presentification”  or  rendering  present
(vorstellig  machen)  in  the  form  of  depiction  (“vergegenwärtigt,  verbildlicht,
veranschaulicht”). The image-subject saturates the image in such a manner that
it  is not only that we see something  in an image,  but that,  we also,  in this
manner, become immersed in an image, or into an image-world or image-space.
As Husserl remarks: «We see the intended object in the image or the intended
21 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 31.
22 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 29. «[…] eine Erscheinung eines Nicht-Jetzt im Jetzt» or «eines Nicht-
erscheinenden im Erscheinenden».
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object looks at us from the image».23 The ambivalence of “or” in this statement
expresses  the  ambivalence  of  directionality.  Husserl  speaks  of  the  intended
object looking at me from the image; this description is indicative of the sense in
which we become immersed in, or drawn into, an image – the “spell” of the
image, to which we are captive and captivated.
4.
This  immersion  (or:  absorption)  into  an  image  is  also  connected  to  my
embodiment.  Contrary  to  a  purely  “intellectualist”  or  “disembodied”
perspective  on  image-consciousness,  Husserl  explores  the  different  ways  in
which my embodiment  contributes  to,  and  becomes  itself  transformed and
projected  into,  an  image.  Given  that  image-consciousness  is  based  on
perceptual experience, the perception of the image-thing involves, according to
Husserl  phenomenological  theory  of  perception,  visual  and kinaesthetic
sensations.  In  the  painting  of  a  landscape,  for  example,  the  imaginary-
appearances (the depicted trees, etc.) are given in a certain spatial orientation,
relative to the position of my own body. Moreover, my eyes must move across
the surface the painting in scanning the landscape. In addition to the actual
movement  of  my eyes  (but  also,  of  my body as  I  shift  my bodily  position,
moving closer to the painting, etc.), Husserl insists on the figurative dimension
of  saccadic  eye  movement.  As  Husserl  remarks,  «eine  Erscheinung als  Bild
erleben, das fordert, all das modifiziert haben, also auch die kinästhetischen
Empfindungen».24 I am drawn into the image along the lines of the constituting
double-apprehension of image-consciousness. As Husserl notes, «das Ich und
der Ich-Leibe [ist  auch]  in die Verbildlichung mit  hineingezogen».25 On this
view, the appearance of the image-object, in its hybrid condition in-between
perception (image-thing) and imagination (image-subject), is inseparable from
experienced  “quasi-sensations”  and  “quasi-kinaesthetic  sensations.”  The
spatiality of my body becomes projected into the image and this accounts for
the  different  ways  in  which,  in  first-person  shooter  computer  games,  for
example, the spatiality of the computer game space happens through “quasi-
kinaesthetic” sensations. Not only does my own body move to the left or to the
right (as when I respond by jerking to the left or the right when handling the
23 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 32. «In das Bild schauen wir den gemeinten Gegenstand hinein, oder aus
ihm schaut er <zu> uns her» (my emphasis).
24 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 293.
25 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 302.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 2, n. 2 (2014)
106                                                                                                        Nicolas de Warren
controls), but the schema of my body becomes lived-through “at a distance,”
and “in the picture or image.” There is a “virtualization” of embodiment that is
both experienced through the image but also constitutive of the spatiality of
the image or image-space. 
Yet,  to  what  extent  can  we  speak  phenomenologically  of  an  embodied
experience  within  a  virtual  world?  Even  though Husserl  speaks  of  “quasi-
kinaesthetic”  sensations  of  the  imaginary,  it  remains  a  complex  question
whether the lived-body (Leib) can in truth appear and be experienced within the
imaginary.  In  Ideen II,  we find an extremely suggestive passage that  speaks
directly to this issue (albeit, it goes without saying, not in the present context of
a concern with virtual  reality).  As Husserl  famously argues,  the lived-body
(Leib)  is  originally  constituted  through  the  sense  of  touch.  “Tactuality”
(Taktualität) is accorded a special constitutive function, which Husserl signals
by  creating  a  special  term  –  Empfindnis.  Whereas  the  term  Empfindung,  a
classical  term  for  sensations,  is  reserved  for  Husserl  to  speak  of  visual,
auditory, and olfactory sensations, the sense of touch is given its own term in
order to identify what  is  peculiar  about  tactile  sensations  from other  sense
modalities. In order to further describe the peculiarity of touch and its special
constitutive  function,  Husserl  images  a  purely  ocular  subject.  In  such  an
instance, as he writes: «A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not
at all have an appearing body [Leib]; this subject would have appearances of things
in the play of kinaesthetic motivations (which could not be apprehended in a
bodily manner), this subject would see real things. One could not say, however,
that a subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could see his own body
[Leib],  since he would be missing the specific character of his body, and even
the freedom of kinaesthetic developments that go hand in hand with the free
movement of this “body” would not make it into his body».26
In the development of Husserl’s analysis in Ideen II, this example serves the
critical function of illustrating the constitutive difference between vision and
touch as well as the general insight that it is this difference that constitutes the
body into a lived-body. Whereas vision is a purely objectifying consciousness
or experience,  since the objects  of my vision are given to me as not-me,  as
standing there before me, and thus always at a distance, tactile experiences are
constituted  around  a  distinctive  form  of  “double-apprehension”
(Doppelauffassung). Hence the rational for the introduction of the specific term
of Empfindnis for tactile sensations. What is distinction with tactile sensations is
that,  as  Husserl’s  celebrated  example  of  the  hands  touching  each  other
illustrates,  as  the  left  hand touches  the right  hand,  we experience both the
26 HUSSERL 1952, Hua IV, p. 150 (my translation).
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sensation of the right hand being touched by the left while also the left hand
feeling itself as touching; but whereas in the first instance, the left hand makes
known  to  me  (“objectifies”)  the  physical  properties  of  my  right  hand
(roughness, extension, etc.), the sensation of sensing within the left hand does
not make known to me real, objective physical properties of its own hand even
as it does feel or make known objective feature of the right. Husserl emphasizes
this  peculiarity  of  touching’s  double-sensation  in  terms  of  localization:  the
sensing of my hand is localized in the hand itself in a manner in which the
sensing of vision is not. There is no visual impression of vision itself. Vision
does not  “localize”  itself  in the eyes.  I  do not  sense my eyes  seeing in the
manner in which I sense my hand touching. What is peculiar, in other words, is
the localization of sensation in touch: I sense the place from which I touch. This
experience of the body as both sensed and sensing accounts for the double-
constitution of body through touch – even though Husserl does not claim that
what turns my body into my lived body is that my hands touch it, but that
something touches it. 
If  we  return  to  Husserl’s  example,  we  can  imagine  that  a  purely  ocular
subject – a subject whose only sense is the sense of vision – as a disembodied
subject within a virtual world. First person shooter games (for example,  the
classic  Doom)  or  the  point  of  view  of  avatar  in  Second  Life  situate  the
player/driver  from  a  point  of  view  in  which  the  body  cannot  be  fully
represented on the screen. We can take this as emblematic of Husserl’s claim
that the appearance of the body, by which he means, to experience one’s own
body from within, as a lived-body, requires tactility and in the specific sense of
the localization of tactile sensations. The body can be seen as a thing like any
other material and extended spatial object, yet it is only through what Husserl
calls «das Einlegen der Empfindungen im Abtasten, durch das Einlegen der
Schmerzempfindungen  usw.,  kurzum  durch  die  Lokalisation  der
Empfindungen» that the body becomes lived.27 
The “dual-apprehension” of tactility (the touched physical properties and the
sensing of touch itself) is not the only peculiarity of the lived-body. The lived-
body  is  also  the  intersection  of  two systems  of  “conditionality”:  physical
causality  and  psycho-physical  motivation.  The  lived-body  (Leib),  as  both  a
material  body and a self-animating body,  marks the place (die  Stelle)  where
both of these systems are interwoven.28 On the one hand, the causal nexus of
the world is constituted for me through my perceptual experiences of my body:
not only can I perceive physical properties of objects (elasticity, etc.) and their
27 HUSSERL 1952, Hua IV, p. 151.
28 HUSSERL 1952, Hua IV, § 18.
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causal interaction, but my own body is subject to the same forces and laws of
causality as any other material body. On the other hand, how objects appear to
me can also change, yet not merely as a function of causal change in the world.
Fictional objects, due to their intrinsic lack of materiality and hence possible
real  causal  interactions with other material  bodies,  are “interactive” only in
correlation to the kinaesthetic system of motivations that governs the changing
landscape  of  appearances  for  a  subject.  The  so-called  “real”  interactions  of
virtual  objects  on the screen (the explosion of  an object caused by a missile,
jumping  over  an  obstacle,  opening  a  door)  are  constituted  through  the
motivational nexus of perception and their corresponding movements in my
hand (as it controls the joystick, etc). My lived-body constitutes the spatiality of
a  fictional  environment  on  the  screen  “at  a  distance”  from  my  own
embeddness  in  the  causal  nexus  of  the  world.  The  entanglement  of  two
systems of conditionality is temporally suspended, thus allowing the system of
motivational  conditionality  to  constitute  apart a  quasi-spatial  and  quasi-
material world on screen. 
5.
Husserl argues that the imagination is a distinct form of consciousness, not to
be conflated with  a  form of  image-consciousness.  Image consciousness  is  a
consciousness of “otherness” (Bewußtseins des ‘Andersseins’) based on a conflict
(Widerstreitsbewußtseins)  and  “doubling  of  consciousness”  (Verdoppelung  des
Bewußtseins)  or  “division  of  consciousness”  (eine  Zwiespältigkeit  des
Bewusstseins).29 It  is  this  division within consciousness  that  becomes further
radicalized,  and  enriching  for  the  life  of  consciousness,  with  the  pure
imagination, such that, as we shall next discuss, consciousness  itself  becomes
“virtual” or “irreal.” Acts of what Husserl calls the pure imagination take the
form  of  the  “consciousness  of  the  not-present”  (Nichtgegenwärtigkeits-
Bewußtseins).30 Both  are  forms of  “re-presentification”  (Vergegenwärtigung)  in
which an object – the depicted image-subject in image-consciousness and the
imaginary object in imagination – is given as absent or “not-present.” In the
case of the pure imagination, an act of consciousness (the act of imagining so
and  so)  intends  its  imaginary  object,  yet  this  act  of  consciousness  is  not
founded on  an  underlying  perceptual  apprehension  of  an image-thing  (the
image as a physical object) or an image-object. To see an image of a unicorn is
29 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 32; pp. 46-47.
30 HUSSERL 1980, Hua XXIII, p. 59.
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not  the  same as  to  imagine  a  unicorn.  In  the  case  of  the  imagination,  the
imagined unicorn is discontinuous with perceptual experience, as it possesses
a “neutralized” form of givenness. The imaginary unicorn is neither real nor
unreal, but “irreal” or “virtual.” As with image-consciousness, the imagination
is also, but differently, a form of double-consciousness. When I imagine seeing
a unicorn, consciousness, on Husserl’s account, reproduces its own activity of
perception in a modified form. Consciousness creates a semblance of its own
activity of perception. When I imagine a unicorn, I am not looking at an actual
image of a unicorn in my mind; instead, I seem to see a unicorn, when in actual
fact I am not seeing anything at all. My consciousness takes on the modified
form  of  resembling  what  it  is  to perceive  a  unicorn.  This  semblance  of
consciousness  constitutes the “as if”  (als  ob)  character of the imaginary:  the
unicorn appears to me as if it actually appeared to me; in imagining that I see a
unicorn, it is as if I actually perceived a unicorn. This double-consciousness of
the  imagination  is  a  consciousness  in  conflict  with  itself.  Consciousness
neutralizes  itself  in  imagining  an  experience  that  it  does  not  actually
experience,  but  which,  nonetheless,  it  experiences  in  a  modified  form,  as
“irreal,” as an experience at a distance.
As discussed, in both instances of image-consciousness and the imagination,
consciousness is itself modified; in the particular instance of the imagination,
consciousness  is  “virtualized”  or  “irrealized”  in  such  a  manner  that
consciousness divides or splits  itself  (what Husserl  calls:   Ich-Spaltung).  The
imagined  consciousness  is  “irrealized”  in  the  sense  of  losing  its
determinateness,  while  still  retaining its  character as a lived experience.  As
Husserl  observes:  «Das Ich ist  unbestimmt, wie ja auch das Phantasieobjekt
sind –  so unbestimmt,  dass  man nach ihrem näheren Wie gar  nicht  fragen
kann. So kann ich auch nicht fragen, was für einen Leib der Bild-Zuschauer hat
etc.».31 In this respect, the self-division of consciousness produces and sustains
an  “imagination-ego”  or  “phantom-ego”  (Phantasie-Ego)  along  with  a
“phantom-body,”  which can be  transformed,  and with which consciousness
becomes other than itself. By the same token, the imagined or phantom-ego
becomes  open  in  its  indeterminateness:  I  become  other  in  losing  the
determinateness that I am. As Husserl argues, the imagination produces «ein
pures Phantasie-Ich, mit einer unbestimmten Leiblichkeit, einer unbestimmten
Persönlichkeit,  bestimmt  nur  durch  die  Akte  der  Betrachtung,  der
Aufmerksamkeit,  das  Haben  des  Aspekte,  das  Erleben  der  vom  Künstler
mittels des Bildes erregten Stimmungen»32. It is on account of this openness of
31 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 301.
32 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p.301.
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consciousness in becoming other than itself that consciousness can project itself
into lives of others, whether real or imaginary. Moreover, on the strength of the
earlier account of the image as a platform for the imagination – as a site of the
imagination – consciousness can project its imagined-ego onto the platform of
an image:  I  become the  representation or  image  of  my imaginary  life.  The
imagined ego is experienced at a distance “from myself,” as a fictionalization
or fictional modification of my actual ego.
This  modification  of  the  ego  and  its  self-alienation,  so  to  speak,  into  a
“phantom-ego”  constitutes  the  possibility  of  projecting  myself  into  the
imaginary (Hineinphantasieren). As Husserl expresses the insight: «I am an actor
in an imagined world» («Ich bin Akteur in der phantasierten Welt»).33 But as
Husserl asks: «Ist  das Subjekt in der Phantasie  mit seinem Leib identisch mit
dem aktuellen Ich?»34 Though the imagined-ego is not identical with my actual
ego,  some  over-lap  must  occur,  in  the  sense  that  my  imagined-ego  is  the
analogon of my actual ego. I see myself – my consciousness and its incarnation –
“from inside.” 
6.
As I hope my discussion has suggested, this capacity to experience myself at a
distance and produce an incompatibility within myself constitutes the basis for
the experience of virtual or simulated realities. I can become a spectator to my
own consciousness, which has been “detached” from myself. I can project my
simulated  consciousness  elsewhere  –  a  technological  platform,  an  artificial
ecology,  another human being,  or an imaginary world.  The ability for role-
playing requires a complex constitution whereby I project a semblance of my
own  consciousness  into  an  “object”  of  image-consciousness  (in  the  case  of
visually driven computer games); yet,  I  do so without necessarily having to
identify with  this  imagined  life.  There  is  no  necessary  implication  that  the
virtual consciousness I imagine must be a consciousness in which I identify
myself or which expresses a wish fulfillment. Given that the imaginary is based
on an incompatibility within consciousness, there is no one single meaning or
rule that structures this “self experience at a distance;” hence, the centrality of
play in the constitution of simulated worlds. An appropriate description for
33 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 313. See also HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII «Das Ich in der Phantasie ist hier
phantasiemässig  bewusst  dem  aktuellen  Ich,  es  ist  nicht  abbildlich  vergegenwärtigt,  sondern
reproduktiv.», p. 303.
34 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 303.
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this neutralization of consciousness is that consciousness produces itself as a
virtual  consciousness  in  the  experience  of  the  imaginary.  Computer  games  are
technological platforms for the “virtualization of consciousness” precisely to
the degree that I am capable of experiencing myself at a distance through an
image-consciousness into which I project and re-constitute myself as other than
actual.
This sketch of a phenomenological  approach to virtual  fictions centers on
Husserl’s guiding insight into the “double-consciousness” of the imagination,
and the manner in which consciousness becomes other than itself through a
self-induced modification or “self-virtualization.” If  we return to two of the
studies evoked in my introductory comments, it is clear the extent to which a
phenomenological treatment of the imagination, even in the outline form here
presented, can further our understanding of the exercise of the imagination in
VR. As Burnett notes: «Games are about gaps, and gaps are about finding a
place for the player to affect the experiences he or she has. They are about role
playing  and  imaginary  projections  of  self  into  interfaces  that  have  enough
power to absorb a variety of needs and desires. In other words, they are about
using the power of fantasy to allow players to see into their motivations and to
hear  their  desires  through  the  avatars  that  are  generated  in  the  screen
environment».35 This  gap  is  precisely  the  double-consciousness  of  the
imagination,  as  explored  through  Husserl’s  phenomenological  framework.
Even more strikingly: Boellstorff reports a Second Life resident exclaiming that
«this  is  how I  see myself  on the inside»,  as  testimony to  her experience  of
virtual embodiment. In the words of another Second Life resident: «in real life,
you get to know someone from the outside in, but in Second Life you get to
know  them  from  the  inside  out».36 As  Husserl  remarked  in  his  own
investigation of the imagination: «Das hier zur Vorstellung kommende Ich ist
ein  Spiegelbild  meines  aktuellen,  also  selbstwahrgenommenen  Ich,  also
Leiblichkeit und Geistigkeit von ‘innen’ gesehen, nicht von ‘außen’ gesehen».37
35 BURNETT 2005, p. 190.
36 BOELLSTORFF 2008, p. 134; p. 159.
37 HUSSERL 1973, Hua XIII, p. 306. 
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